





















UNDERSTANDING TERRORIST NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 




























ISSN 0924-7815 Understanding terrorist network topologies and their resilience
against disruption
Roy Lindelaufa;b Peter Bormb Herbert Hamersb
November 4, 2009
Abstract
This article investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks.
Using the secrecy versus information tradeo® characterization of covert networks it is shown
that their network structures are generally not small-worlds, in contradistinction to many overt
social networks. This ¯nding is backed by empirical evidence concerning Jemaah Islamiyah's
Bali bombing and a heroin distribution network in New York. The importance of this ¯nding lies
in the strength such a topology provides. Disruption and attack by counterterrorist agencies
often focuses on the isolation and capture of highly connected individuals. The remarkable
result is that these covert networks are well suited against such targeted attacks as shown
by the resilience properties of secrecy versus information balanced networks. This provides an
explanation of the survival of global terrorist networks and food for thought on counterterrorism
strategy policy.
Keywords: terror networks; terrorist cells; network structure; counterterrorism.
JEL classi¯cation: C02, C79.
As researchers have begun to unravel the structure and dynamics of many di®erent social, bi-
ological and other complex networks (Strogatz 2001, Jasny et al. 2003, Newman et al. 2006)) it
is realized that the study of criminal and terrorist networks can also bene¯t from insights thus
obtained (Zacharias et al. 2008). Typically research on terrorist or criminal networks, i.e., covert
networks, considers destabilization strategies (Farley 2003, Carley 2006), organizational character-
izations (McCormick & Owen 2000, Enders and Su 2007, Morselli et al. 2007) and methods for
key player identi¯cation (Sparrow 1991, Borgatti 2002). Network oriented research in this domain
is ordinarily done by either assuming a ¯xed network topology or by the use of empirical historical
data (Magouirk 2008, Asal et al. 2007). However, data on this topic is often inaccurate and anec-
dotal due to the widespread secrecy surrounding governmental data-sets. Mathematical models
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1provide an alternative method for gaining insight into covert organizational structures. Once data
becomes available these models can be evaluated and adjusted if necessary.
For many types of (overt) networks the position of their connection topology between the
extremes of order and randomness has been established (Watts and Strogatz 1998, Watts 2004).
However, little is known about the exact position of the connection topology of covert networks,
and consequently about their resilience against disruption. The current study shows where covert
networks are positioned by making use of their topological characterization as secrecy in°uenced
communication structures (Lindelauf et al. 2009a/b). We ¯nd that the common characterization
of social systems as small-world networks is generally not applicable to covert networks. This
phenomenon can be explained by the fundamental dilemma such organizations have to solve: how to
e±ciently coordinate and exercise control while at the same time remaining secret. We corroborate
our results with empirical ¯ndings of Jemaah Islamiyah's bombing of a Bali nightclub (Koschade
2006) and the active core of a heroin distribution network in New York City (Natarajan 2006). In
addition we show that a covert network topology is strongly resilient against disruption strategies
focused on capturing and isolating highly connected individuals, partly explaining the di±culties
in disrupting current terror networks.
Theoretical results and empirical investigations indicate that terrorist organizations have to
make a trade-o® between e±cient coordination and control on the one hand and maintaining
secrecy on the other. For instance Enders and Su (2007) model the process by which terrorists
select `between the competing ends of security versus the unbridled °ow of information'. They argue
that rational terrorists will attempt to counter increased e®orts at in¯ltration and restructure
themselves to be less penetrable, often by adopting certain network structures. That terrorist
organizations take secrecy explicitly into account is well known: in a video lecture Mousab al
Suri (an alleged Al Qaeda a±liate that was captured in November 2005) indicates that certain
network structures should be avoided to ensure the secrecy of the organization (Bergen 2006).
Terrorists operating according to networked organizational forms are also observed in practice. For
instance the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack showed tactical commanders and individual team members
using satellite and cell phones to connect to strategic commanders out of theatre. Multiple teams
consisting of several individuals were able to communicate and direct each other as the attacks
progressed. What sets apart such attacks is not the use of technology per se but the networked mode
2of operation that it enables. The organizational form of these attackers is not easily characterized
as being 'hierarchical' or 'decentralized'. However, what is clear is that terrorist, insurgent and
criminal organizations are increasingly able to cross borders, engage in °uent relationships and
`swarm' their objectives to achieve their goals. The underlying mechanism to all these operations
is the networked topology: information is exchanged on communication networks, weapons di®use
through tra±cking networks and Shura councils meet in a±liation networks. It is therefore of
paramount importance to understand these network structures.
Lindelauf et al. (2009a) introduce a multi-objective optimization framework to analyze the
structure of terrorist networks taking the secrecy versus information tradeo® into account. That this
tradeo® exists is intuitively clear: if everybody in the covert organization knows everybody else, then
the security risk to the organization is very high because the exposure of an individual potentially
exposes the entire organization. On the other hand, a very sparsely connected organizational
network topology is di±cult to coordinate and control, simply because e±cient communication
between individuals in such an organization is hard. We capture these critical considerations by
use of an information measure I, a secrecy measure S, and a balanced trade-o® measure ¹. A
detailed description of the methodology used can be found in the the appendix. The information
measure I re°ects the fact that the ability to transfer information between individuals in a network
is inversely proportional to the number of edges in the shortest path between those individuals.
On the other hand, the secrecy measure S re°ects the fraction of individuals in the network that
is expected to remain unexposed upon capture of individuals according to a realistically chosen
probability distribution. Finally the total performance of a covert organization in dealing with the
information versus secrecy trade-o® dilemma is re°ected by the multi-objective optimization based
function ¹ = SI. The higher the value of ¹ a network attains, the better it does in balancing
secrecy and information.
Terrorist networks evolve, i.e., `it would be naive to think that terrorists and their networks
would remain invariant to measures designed to track and in¯ltrate the inner workings of their
organizations' (Enders and Su 2007). To what kind of structures do these terrorist networks
evolve? Clearly, we argue that the proactive counterterrorism activities after 9/11 have resulted
in terrorist networks adopting more decentralized, non-hierarchical networks, i.e., they have taken
secrecy explicitly into account as design parameter. Thus these terrorist networks are a very special
3subset of general social networks about which a great deal is known (see for instance Wasserman
and Faust 1994). For instance it is well known that many social networks can be characterized
as small-worlds, i.e., most individuals in the network can be reached by a small number of steps.
The evidence concerning terrorist network structures however is often anecdotal, providing an
impetus for the development of theoretical models of covert networks. The aim of this article is
therefore to analyze the structure of secrecy in°uenced terrorist networks, investigate their small-
world properties and the resulting consequences on their survivability properties. The next section
discusses the application of the secrecy versus information tradeo® characterization of terrorist
networks to the analysis of their small-world structure. The important insight is that such terrorist
networks do not appear to be small-worlds. A fact that can be motivated from a secrecy standpoint.
In addition we will present empirical proof of this claim. Next we investigate the resilience of these
terrorist network structures against disruption. We ¯nd that such network structures perform well
against disruption, actually they outperform common social networks in case of targeted attacks.
A fact that should have profound implications for counterterrorist strategies.
Small-world network analysis
Watts and Strogatz (1998) quanti¯ed small-worlds as networks with low characteristic path length
L and high clustering coe±cient C relative to random networks with the same number of vertices.
The characteristic path length L is a global property that measures the typical separation between
two individuals in the network. Obviously the characteristic path length L will be inversely related
to the information measure I. This because a high separation between terrorists in the network will
make it di±cult for them to coordinate and control as re°ected by a low information measure. The
clustering coe±cient C, a local property, measures the cliqueshness of a typical neighborhood. In
many social networks an individual's friends are also friends among each other. Clearly, in covert
networks this in general will not be the case because too many interconnections among individuals
will degrade the secrecy of such an organization. The clustering coe±cient C is based on the
number of edges that exist between the neighbors of each vertex.
It is generally argued that covert organizations facing an exogenous threat transform into hybrid
network structures that lie somewhere in between sparse networks (such as the star, ring, lattice
or path) and the complete network in which everybody is connected to everybody else (Arquilla
4and Ronfeldt 2001). To simulate this transformation we interpolate between regular networks
and the complete network and for each instance establish the optimality of the resulting network
with regard to the secrecy versus information tradeo® characterization. To investigate whether the
small-world characterization of various social networks also holds true for covert networks, we thus
generate intermediate hybrid networks. Our procedure starts with an initial network (a star, ring,
path or lattice) and with a probability p that each vacant edge is added. For ¯xed values of p
several indicators relating to the small-world structure (L;C) and the secrecy versus information
tradeo® (¹) of the network are computed and averaged over 20 realizations. In Fig.1 we plot the
normalized values of L, C and ¹ versus p for each of the four possible initial networks. It can be
seen that the maximum value of ¹, indicating approximate optimal covert network structures, is
typically not attained at low characteristic path lengths and high clustering coe±cients, features
that characterize small-world networks. For instance, if the initial graph equals the path graph
(Fig. 1 top right), then it can be seen that ¹ attains its maximum around p = 0:09, where the
value of L is small and C does not attain a high value. In particular, the tiny fraction of shortcuts
that su±ces to create small-worlds, although increasing the ability to communicate, increases the
security risk to a covert network. Clearly covert networks favor low clustering because this is in










































































































Figure 1: Normalized characteristic path length L, clustering coe±cient C and performance measure
¹ as a function of the probability p with which each vacant edge is added to an initial network
which is a lattice (top left), path (top right), star (bottom left) or ring (bottom right). All networks
have 100 vertices and L, C and ¹ are averaged over 20 realizations for each of the values for p.
6Empirical examples
Our simulation shows that the small-world phenomenon is not characteristic of theoretically optimal
covert networks. To obtain additional evidence we compute the characteristic path length and
clustering coe±cient for empirical covert networks: a heroin distribution network in New York city
and the Jemaah Islamiyah cell responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002. We compare these values
to the characteristic path length and clustering coe±cient of a graph with the same number of
vertices in which every possible edge occurs independently with probability p = 1
2, i.e., a random
graph. To compare these outcomes with networks that are small-worlds we present an empirical
example of a ¯lm-actor network (Watts and Strogatz 1998). It can be seen that both empirical
covert networks do not show the small-world phenomenon because their characteristic path lengths
as well as clustering coe±cients are comparable to those of a random network (table 1). The ¯lm
actor network however is a small-world: its characteristic path length is of similar order as the
random graph on the same number of nodes whereas its clustering is much higher.
Lactual Lrandom Cactual Crandom
Heroin Network 4.74 4.93 0.44 0.13
Jemaah Islamiyah 3.18 3.11 0.89 0.46
Film actors 3.65 2.99 0.79 0.00027
Table 1: Comparison of characteristic path lengths and clustering coe±cients of two empirical
covert networks and an overt empirical network (¯lm actors) and 100.000 randomly generated
graphs with the same number of vertices.
It is also interesting to investigate whether these empirical covert networks optimize their struc-
ture according to the theoretical framework on the secrecy versus information tradeo® dilemma.
Therefore we compute ¹ for both empirical covert networks (¹he and ¹ji respectively) and we ap-

















0:38 = 0:74. We may conclude that both networks
attain empirical values for ¹ that are close to optimal and hence correspond to the region (Fig.
1) within which the existence of a possible small-world structure is contradicted. Thus we obtain
further evidence for the fact that covert organizations are not small-worlds. In the next section we
will explain the advantage of adopting structures di®ering from small-worlds.
7Covert network resilience
To counter the terrorist threat it is essential to focus on the terrorists (Sageman 2008). Generally
speaking, in countering a covert network, the removal or isolation of individuals is a key strat-
egy, the e®ect of which is in part determined by the network's robustness properties. An example
of this is the U.S. government's hope on decapitating Al Qaeda by pursuing high-value targets.
In complex network theory it has been shown that networks with a few highly connected nodes
(hubs) are resistant to random failures because these hubs dominate their topology (Albert et al.
2000). However, this comes at the cost of vulnerability to deliberate attacks on such hubs. This
appears one of the reasons why empirical covert organizations, instead of relying on a few hubs,
have evolved into decentralized, non-hierarchical structures as theoretically quanti¯ed by our se-
crecy versus information trade-o® performance measure. A case in point is Al Qaeda (Sageman
2008): local groups self-organize by radicalization and interconnect, for instance through the inter-
net. There is no top to bottom leadership or organization. What results is a sparsely connected
network safeguarding secrecy, however with low separation (due to the internet's global reach). To
understand the resilience of such an organizational form we investigate the e®ect of the removal
of a fraction of vertices of an approximate optimal terrorist network on the basis of the secrecy
versus information performance measure. More speci¯cally we compare two scenarios: a fraction f
of vertices is either removed randomly from such an approximate optimal terrorist network or the
same fraction f being removed consists of vertices with the highest degrees. Results are plotted in
Fig.2 (left) in case of random removal and in Fig.2 (right) in case of targeted removal.



































Figure 2: Normalized values of S, I and ¹ as function of the fraction f of randomly (left) and
targeted (right) removed vertices.
8From Fig.2 (left) it can be seen that the fraction of randomly removed vertices does not seem
to a®ect the performance of the remaining network structure very much, i.e., ¹ is only slightly
decreasing with increasing values of f. Only after a very large fraction of vertices has been removed
(f ¼ 0:75) does an e®ect take shape, which can be explained by the disintegration of the network.
Fig.2 (right) on the targeted removal of high degree vertices shows a surprising result. Even
though the information measure decreases rapidly with increasing f, the secrecy performance of
the organization in fact increases. Balancing these two aspects, the total performance measure ¹
increases with respect to the fraction f of targeted removals. Thus the more one focuses a desta-
bilization strategy on the targeted removal of central individuals the more a covert organization's
capacity to coordinate and control is reduced but the higher its performance in balancing the infor-
mation versus secrecy trade-o® will be. Only at very high values for the fraction f ¼ 0:8 does the
performance measure start to decrease. The implication for terrorist networks is obvious. Their
evolution towards global, sparsely connected, leaderless networks has enabled them to survive the
continuing targeted attack on their nodes.
Conclusion
By studying terrorist networks from the small-world perspective we shed new light on their struc-
tures and the implications this holds for their survival. Since covert organizations are aware of
their need to balance secrecy and information, our analysis, using the total performance measure
as an evaluation criterion, shows that their network topology will not satisfy a `small-world' char-
acterization as common in many social systems. In addition we presented empirical evidence to
support this claim. That terrorist networks avoid small-world structures can be explained by the
low secrecy a highly clustered networked organizational form o®ers. Another reason for adopting
a non small-world topology is found in the remarkable advantage the derived network topology
o®ers against targeted removal. It is known that `normal' social network topologies will show fast
degradation in case of removal of hubs. However we have shown that terrorist networks adopting
secrecy and information balanced networks are perfectly capable to outlast targeted attacks. This
may partly explain why current transnational terrorist networks appear to be so resilient: as long
as disruption strategies do not completely disintegrate the network such e®orts only strengthen
their ability to attain a balance at remaining secret while being operationally e®ective...instead of
9disabling them to operate at all.
Appendix
A covert network is modeled by a graph g = (N;E), where N represents the set of members
(terrorists or terror cells) of the organization and E represents the links among these members. For
instance such links may represent the exchange of bomb making material or the communication
over the internet. We set jNj = n and jEj = m. The set of all such networks is indicated by
G(n;m).
Information measure I
The information measure of a graph g 2 G(n;m) is de¯ned by the normalized reciprocal of the





Here T(g) equals the total geodesic distance, i.e., T(g) =
P
(i;j)2N2 lij(g) with lij(g) the geodesic
distance between vertex i and vertex j. It follows that 0 · I(g) · 1. Thus the information measure
captures the ability of the terrorist organization to exchange information, i.e., to coordinate and
control. The higher the value for I the better the organization can do so.
Secrecy measure S
The secrecy measure of a graph g 2 G(n;m) is de¯ned by
S(g) =






Here di(g) equals the degree of vertex i in g. It follows that 0 · S(g) · 1. It can be seen that the
secrecy measure equals the expected fraction of the organization that survives given that members
of the organization are exposed according to a realistically chosen probability distribution.
Balanced trade-o® performance measure ¹
10For g 2 G(n;m) it holds that,
¹(g) = S(g)I(g) =






Following multi-objective optimization theory the terrorist organization, faced with trading o®
secrecy versus information, adopts those values of S and I that maximize their product. For a
more thorough motivation of this measure see Lindelauf et al. (2009a).
Small-world indicators






















Here ¡i(g) = fj 2 Njlij(g) = 1g is the set of neighbors of vertex i in network g, and Ni(g) =
ffk;lg 2 ¡i(g)jlkl(g) = 1g is the set of neighbor pairs of vertex i that are connected in g. Small-
world networks are characterized by low L and high C. When compared to random networks a
small-world network satis¯es L ¼ Lrandom and C is of a di®erent order of magnitude than Crandom.
Use of normalization
Since only relative comparison plays a role we normalized the indicators I, S, L, C and ¹ by dividing
them by the maximum they attained at each relevant instance. This avoids scaling di®erences in
the corresponding ¯gures but does not a®ect the resulting analysis.
Generating an approximate optimal covert network
A theoretically optimal covert network was approximated on n = 100 individuals as follows. We
let p 2 f0:3;0:4;0:5;0:6;0:7g and for each ¯xed p we generated 100.000 random graphs with each
11possible edge present independently and identically distributed with probability p. Among these
500.000 networks the one that attained the highest value for ¹ was selected.
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